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I. INTRODUCTION
In EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., an employer, through its
counsel, attempted to discuss and negotiate an employment discrimination
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“Commission”).1 Instead of responding to the employer, the Commission
declared that efforts to conciliate were unsuccessful and filed suit against the
employer in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2
This is just one instance where the Commission has demonstrated it does not
always participate in good faith in the required conciliation process.3 A
minimal review of conciliation efforts is necessary, and Congress should
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) to provide
courts the power to sanction the Commission or an employer that does not
engage in good faith in conciliation.
The purpose of conciliation is for opposing parties to avoid the court
system by encouraging out-of-court settlements.4 Employers in the majority
of circuits can argue failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense when
employers feel the Commission has failed its duty to conciliate.5 However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that
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340 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1258–59.
See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Commission
failed to participate in good faith conciliation when it did not respond to an employer’s requests for
ten months).
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d at 1260.
See Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462; Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256; EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Radiator
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
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conciliation efforts are not judicially reviewable and as such cannot be raised
as an affirmative defense.6
This Comment will discuss the background and policy of conciliation,
specifically, using failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense. This
Comment will discuss the three conciliation methods currently in use,
followed by a discussion of what Title VII provides regarding judicial review
of the Commission’s conciliation efforts. This Comment will further discuss
the precedent that exists for judicial review in labor disputes under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Finally, this Comment will argue
that a minimal review of conciliation efforts is necessary and suggest that a
statutory amendment is needed to encourage both the Commission and an
employer to participate in good faith in the conciliation process.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to give the Commission litigation
authority. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19727 authorizes the
Commission to bring suit against employers who engage in unlawful
discrimination practices.8 The Commission must follow specific procedural
requirements to bring suit on behalf of an employee.9 After receiving a
complaint of an alleged unlawful employment practice, the Commission
must investigate the potential claim to determine its truthfulness.10 When
there is reasonable cause that an unlawful employment practice occurred, the
Commission must issue a letter of determination notifying the employer. 11
The Commission “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and

6.
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See EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013).
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
Id. (“[I]f within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after
expiration of any period . . . the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil
action . . . .”).
Id. § 2000e-5(b).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a)-(b) (2013).
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persuasion.”12 The duty to conciliate is a condition precedent to the
Commission’s right to sue on behalf of an employee.13
Through conciliation, the Commission “shall attempt” to achieve an
equitable resolution of violations and secure an agreement that eliminates the
alleged unlawful discrimination and provides relief for the employee. 14
Conciliation offers an employer the possibility of voluntary compliance prior
to the filing of a formal claim by the Commission.15 “[N]othing that is said
or done during and as part of the informal endeavors of the Commission to
eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal methods . . . may be
made a matter of public information . . . or used as evidence in a subsequent
proceeding . . . .”16 The Commission must attempt conciliation prior to
bringing suit against an employer. Where conciliation attempts are
successful, the terms of the agreement must be reduced to writing and signed
by the parties and the Commission.17 However, when the Commission
determines it cannot reach a conciliation agreement, it must notify the
employer in writing.18 The Commission may file suit after it determines an
impasse has been reached.19
The legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act20
shows that Congress believed the duty to conciliate was of the utmost
importance. Congress stated, “Only if conciliation proves to be impossible
do we expect the Commission to bring an action in federal district court to
seek enforcement.”21 Thus, the purpose of conciliation is to avoid the court
system by encouraging out-of-court settlements.22 Conciliation enables the
Commission and an employer to negotiate in an attempt to determine how
the employer may alter its practices to comply with the law and establish any
damages the employer may pay.23 As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit observed, “Since the Act states that the Commission ‘shall’
endeavor to eliminate alleged unlawful employment practices by
conciliation, and sue only if it is unable to secure a conciliation agreement, it
has generally been held that a showing of some effort is a precondition of
bringing suit.”24 The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.24.
Resolving a Charge, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/resolving.cfm (last visited Apr. 13,
2015).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.26.
Id. § 1601.24.
Id. § 1601.25.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2013).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972).
EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996).
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1978).
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resolving employment discrimination claims by informal means.25 Congress
determined voluntary compliance was the “preferred means for achieving the
goal of equality of employment opportunities.”26
However, the statutory provisions raise a question regarding the
Commission’s obligations as a prerequisite to bringing suit. Employers in
the majority of circuits can argue failure to conciliate as an affirmative
defense when employers feel the Commission has failed its duty to
conciliate.27 Courts will review the Commission’s conciliation procedure,
and in cases where the Commission has not met its duty to conciliate, courts
have either dismissed the complaint28 or have infrequently awarded summary
judgment for the defendant.29 However, the Seventh Circuit recently held
that conciliation efforts are not judicially reviewable and as such cannot be
raised as an affirmative defense.30
A. Survey of Court Cases
As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, there are now three
different stances taken by the federal circuits regarding conciliation.31 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
engage in a minimal level of review to determine whether conciliation was
attempted in good faith.32 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits employ a more exacting three-part
inquiry to determine whether conciliation was in good faith.33 The Seventh
Circuit will no longer review the Commission’s conciliation efforts.34

25.

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977) (“[T]he EEOC does not
function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal
administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment
discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion.”) (emphasis
added).
Id. at 367–68 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340
F.3d 1256; Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty
Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527.
See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d at 19; EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375,
378–79 (5th Cir. 1981).
See EEOC v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (Mass. D. 1979).
See EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
See id.; Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256; Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097.
See Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097; Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178; Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527.
See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340
F.3d 1256; EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
See Mach Mining, 738 F.2d 171.
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1. Minimal Review for Good Faith
The Sixth Circuit requires the Commission engage in a good faith effort
to conciliate and will allow judicial review to determine if this standard was
met. In EEOC v. Keco Industries, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reviewed the
Commission’s efforts and held that a good faith effort requires only an
attempt at conciliation.35 The form and substance of conciliation is within
the discretion of the Commission and is beyond judicial review.36 Therefore,
a court’s subjective beliefs regarding the content of the Commission’s
conciliation agreement should not be considered, and only an attempt to
conciliate matters.37
In Keco Industries, the Commission found reasonable cause that the
employer discriminated against female employees.38 The Commission
offered a settlement that addressed its findings of sex discrimination.39 When
the employer rejected the proposed conciliation agreement, the Commission
filed a discrimination claim against the employer.40 The court rejected the
employer’s failure to conciliate defense and found the Commission made a
good faith effort by attempting to conciliate the claim.41 The court held that
the Commission must only make a good faith effort to conciliate, and once
the employer rejects the offer, the Commission may file a lawsuit.42 The
court criticized the district court’s review of the Commission’s conciliation
efforts, finding that “an apparent dissatisfaction with the [Commission’s]
conciliation attempt” is not the correct standard of review.43
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits used the same minimal level of review
to examine whether the Commission made a good faith effort in
conciliation.44 In EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., the Commission filed an
employment discrimination claim in district court after the defendant
expressed that a meeting regarding a settlement would be futile.45 The Fourth
Circuit emphasized that conciliation is required and is one of the
Commission’s most essential functions.46 Here, the court found the
Commission made a good faith attempt at conciliation by informing the
employer that there was a reasonable cause determination and attempting to
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1101–02.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
See EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527
(10th Cir. 1978).
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d at 183.
Id.
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resolve the claim through conciliation.47 The employer’s refusal to engage
in conciliation was of no fault by the Commission, and therefore, the
Commission was not precluded from bringing suit.48
In EEOC v. Zia Co., the Tenth Circuit established that, because the
Commission must attempt conciliation before it can bring suit, a good faith
effort is required.49 The court stated that, “The inquiry into the duty of ‘good
faith’ on the part of the [Commission] is relevant to whether the court should
entertain the claim, or stay the proceedings for further conciliation
efforts . . . .”50 As the Tenth Circuit viewed it, judicial review for a good
faith effort does not require a court to examine the specifics of the
proceedings between the Commission and the employer; however, nor does
judicial review allow courts to impose their own beliefs regarding the content
of a conciliation agreement.51 The court held that the Commission engaged
in good faith efforts in the conciliation process by participating in various
negotiations with the defendants.52
This approach of judicial review is deferential to the Commission’s
decisions while also making sure the Commission meets its obligation to
conciliate. Following a failed attempt at voluntary compliance through
conciliation, the Commission may pursue litigation. The Second, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits agree that judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation
efforts is necessary, but these circuits use a more stringent test than minimal
review.
2. Three-Part Inquiry
In EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., an employer raised the
Commission’s failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense in an attempt to
have the lawsuit dismissed.53 The Eleventh Circuit applied a three-part test
to determine whether the Commission engaged in conciliation and whether
the case should be dismissed.54 To satisfy its conciliation obligation, the
Eleventh Circuit determined the Commission must: “(1) outline to the
employer the reasonable cause for belief that Title VII has been violated;
(2) offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a
reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.”55
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id.
340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1259.
Id. (citing EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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In Asplundh, the Commission found reasonable cause to believe
charges of harassment and retaliation were true and issued a Letter of
Determination to the employer on March 31, 1999.56 On April 7, 1999, the
Commission sent a proposed conciliation agreement that included a
nationwide provision requiring the employer to notify all employees of the
alleged discrimination.57 The agreement gave the employer twelve days to
accept or respond.58 Upon receipt of the proposed agreement, the employer
hired local counsel to investigate the potential liability.59 Local counsel
requested a phone call with an investigator to discuss the case and the
Commission’s determination; however, the Commission never responded
and sent a letter the following day declaring that efforts to conciliate were
unsuccessful.60 The district court held that the Commission failed its duty to
conciliate and dismissed the case with sanctions.61
Using the three-part criteria, the court determined that the Commission
did not act in good faith and instead used an “all or nothing approach” that
was intolerable.62 The conciliation proposal did not include a theory of
liability, nor was the agreement proposed even possible.63 The court
concluded that the Commission must use “nothing less than a reasonable
effort to resolve with the employer the issues raised by the complainant . . .”
and when the Commission does not clearly state the charges against the
employer, there has not been “meaningful conciliation.”64 Due to the
Commission’s failure to conciliate, the appellate court affirmed the case’s
dismissal and the sanction of attorney’s fees.65
The Second and Fifth Circuits also used the same three-step approach
to determine whether conciliation was in good faith.66 In EEOC v. Argo
Distribution, L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit determined that the Commission did
not participate in good faith conciliation because it continuously failed to
communicate with the employer and did not respond in a reasonable and
flexible manner to the employer’s position.67 In that case, the employer
requested clarification regarding the Commission’s policy and offered a
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
Id. The Commission’s proposed conciliation agreement sought reinstatement for the employee and
front pay, which was impossible because the employment project at issue ended three years prior
to the suit. Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1261.
See EEOC v. Agro Distrib. L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc.,
91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
Agro Distrib., 555 F.3d at 468.
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settlement, but the Commission failed to respond for ten months.68 Applying
the three-part test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Commission violated
its role as a neutral investigator by failing to participate in good faith
conciliation and respond to the employer in a reasonable and flexible
manner.69 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit explained that conciliation is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite but rather a precondition to a suit.70 Thus, courts
may impose a stay to encourage the Commission to continue conciliation
efforts prior to filing suit, or the case may be dismissed if it seems the
appropriate remedy.71
Similarly, the Second Circuit used the three-part inquiry to examine the
Commission’s conciliation efforts in EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc.72 In
Johnson & Higgins, however, the court determined good faith conciliation
was met because the Commission outlined the reasonable cause of the
employer’s discrimination and attempted to engage in an out-of-court
settlement.73
The circuits that employ the three-part inquiry of judicial review take a
stringent look at the Commission’s conciliation efforts by examining both
the form and substance of conciliation. The circuits that employ a minimal
review are deferential to the Commission’s decisions and do not examine the
substance of conciliation agreements. The Seventh Circuit now opposes
judicial review of conciliation agreements altogether.74
3. Conciliation Efforts Are Not Reviewable
The Seventh Circuit “ha[d] not specifically addressed the standard to
be used by district courts facing allegations of deficient conciliation,”75 prior
to its decision in EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C.76 However, that court had
previously found, in EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n, that the Commission
had a right to bring a claim against an employer because it failed to get what
it asked for in its bargaining agreement.77 The court acknowledged that the
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 468. See also EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In evaluating
whether the EEOC has adequately fulfilled this statutory requirement, the fundamental question is
the reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC's conduct under all the circumstances.”).
Agro Distrib., 555 F.3d at 469.
Id.
91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that although the Commission brought this claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the court’s discussion regarding conciliation
efforts is relevant to the discussion of the conciliation requirements under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act).
Id. at 1535.
EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014).
EEOC v. United Rd. Towing, Inc., No. 10C6259, 2012 WL 1830099, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171.
27 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Commission must pursue conciliation.78 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit
evaluated the sufficiency of the Commission’s “statutorily mandated pre suit
conciliation” efforts generally in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.79 In Sears,
Roebuck & Co., the court held that the Commission abused its conciliation
requirements, among other things, prior to filing suit by refusing to discuss
any of their claims against the employer and by making large monetary
demands strictly to satisfy outside interest groups.80
However, in EEOC v. Mach Mining L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit
reversed its view and held that the failure to conciliate is not an affirmative
defense to a discrimination suit.81 The court stated, “If the [Commission] has
pled on the face of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures
required under Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient
[the court’s] review of those procedures is satisfied.”82 In reaching this
decision, the court evaluated the statutory language, whether there is a
workable standard for such a defense, whether the defense might fit into the
broader statutory scheme, and other relevant case law to determine that no
affirmative defense exists for failure to conciliate.83
The court reasoned that there is no express provision in the text of Title
VII to warrant an affirmative defense based on the Commission’s failure to
conciliate.84 The statute gives the Commission deference regarding the
methods of conciliation and whether a conciliation agreement is acceptable.85
The court believed an affirmative defense did not make sense in light of the
Commission’s sole power to decide whether to accept an agreement.86
Furthermore, an affirmative defense for failure to conciliate would conflict
with the confidentiality provision87 required for the conciliation process.88
“[Because] Title VII contains no exception allowing such information to be
admitted for a collateral purpose, such as to satisfy a court that the EEOC’s
efforts to conciliate were sufficient,” courts would have to decide whether
conciliation was performed correctly without having evidence to review.89

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.

Id.
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 358.
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 172.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2013) (“Nothing said or done during and as part of such informal
endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence
in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”).
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit further noted that an affirmative defense
undermines conciliation by allowing employers to attack the Commission’s
procedures instead of using the process to resolve a dispute.90 Specifically,
the court was concerned that no bright line rule existed for how many offers
or conferences would satisfy the Commission’s duty to conciliate and avoid
judicial review.91 The Seventh Circuit explained, “Simply put, the
conciliation defense tempts employers to turn what was meant to be an
informal negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the
EEOC did enough before going to court.”92
The court did not believe the Commission would engage in bad faith
conciliation because it processes and investigates approximately 100,000
charges of discrimination per year but only files suit in several hundred
cases.93 The court reasoned that judicial review of conciliation is
unnecessary because a trial on the merits protects employers from any bad
faith attempts at conciliation the Commission may make.94 Furthermore, the
Commission and an employer can continue settlement talks after litigation
has been filed, so there is no reason to review conciliation attempts.95
Finally, the court did not feel the remedies provided by judicial review
of conciliation encouraged voluntary compliance by employers.96 Dismissal
on the merits hinders conciliation efforts because an employer will not
resume conciliation efforts following a dismissal.97 In this way, employers
who have participated in actual employment discrimination may avoid
liability based on a procedural technicality.98 Furthermore, the statute does
not explicitly mention judicial review of conciliation, and dismissal on the
merits for the Commission’s failure to conciliate could serve to excuse an
employer’s unlawful discrimination.99 Thus, the Seventh Circuit will not
review conciliation attempts where the Commission has pled on the face of
its complaint that it has complied with all procedures required under Title
VII and all the relevant documents are facially sufficient.100

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 178–79.
Id. at 180 (citing All Statutes FY 1997-2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2015)). In 2012, the Commission engaged in
conciliation in 4207 cases, was unsuccessful in 2616 cases, but filed suit in only 122 cases. Id.
(citing All Statutes FY 1997-2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015)).
94. Id. at 181.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Id. at 183–84.
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id. at 183–84.
100. Id.
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The court criticized other circuits’ approaches to judicial review of the
Commission’s conciliation efforts. The court felt it was unnecessary to hold
the Commission to a requirement of good faith101 in the conciliation process
because of its informal and confidential nature, and also, the statute does not
explicitly require good faith.102 The court specifically criticized the threestep requirement103 as open-ended and requiring courts to make unnecessary
assessments into the fairness and reasonableness of the Commission’s
decisions, which is not mandated by the statute.104 The court reasoned that
departure from these methods of judicial review made sense, because each
method conflicts with the Commission’s discretion to accept or reject a
conciliation agreement as well as the confidentiality provision of the
statute.105
By rejecting judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts,
the Seventh Circuit shows complete trust in the Commission to engage in the
appropriate method of conciliation. However, the majority of circuits believe
that judicial review of conciliation efforts is necessary to ensure good faith
attempts. Judicial review of agency bargaining procedures is also common
in the realm of labor law.
B. There is Precedent for Judicial Review in Labor and Employment Law
Cases
Although Title VII does not explicitly allow for judicial review of the
Commission's conciliation efforts, it also does not speak against it.106
Judicial review of agency bargaining procedures is common in the realm of
labor and employment law. For example, the NLRA107 provides for
employers and unions to engage in good faith collective bargaining to resolve
labor disputes.108 An employer engages in an unfair labor practice by
“refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.”109 Unions have an identical obligation towards employers.110
The NLRA grants the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) the
power to review collective bargaining procedures, if necessary, to make
certain that an unfair labor practice, such as a failure to participate in good
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See EEOC v. Keco Indus. Inc., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984).
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183.
See EEOC v. Agro Distrib. L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009).
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2013).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2013). The NLRA was enacted to “eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred . . . .” Id. § 151.
108. Id. §§ 157, 158(d).
109. Id. § 158(a)(5).
110. Id. § 158(b)(3).
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faith in a collective bargaining agreement, does not occur.111 The NLRB may
appoint another agent such as an administrative law judge to preside over a
hearing to determine whether an unfair labor practice was committed.112 The
NLRB may review an opinion and, upon a finding that an unfair labor
practice was committed, the NLRB “shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . .”113
To enforce the duty of collective bargaining, both the administrative
law judges and the NLRB have authority similar to federal courts to impose
sanctions for parties not complying with the statutory provisions in place.114
Most often, the NLRB will issue a bargaining order accompanied by a cease
and desist order to force an employer or union to engage in good faith
collective bargaining.115 However, in a 1995 decision, the NLRB stated,
“[Where] a respondent's substantial unfair labor practices have infected the
core of a bargaining process to such an extent that their effects cannot be
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an order requiring the
respondent to reimburse the charging party for negotiation expenses is
warranted . . . .”116
For example, in 2011, a healthcare union alleged that a nursing home
employer engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
collectively and in good faith.117 The NLRB affirmed the decision of the
administrative law judge and held that the employer had engaged in unfair
labor practices by reneging from tentative agreements, forcing the union to
renegotiate multiple times, refusing to provide information to the union, and
refusing to accept documents from the union.118 Based on this “aggravated
misconduct” the court ordered the employer to reimburse the union and its
general counsel for “their costs and expenses incurred in the investigation,
preparation, and litigation of the cases” before an administrative law judge
and the board.”119 The collective bargaining approach taken by the NLRA
and enforced by the NLRB provides a model for judicial review of
111. See id. § 160(a). See also Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last visited Apr. 13,
2015) (explaining good faith is assessed by examining the “history of negotiations and
understandings of both parties” to determine whether a true impasse has been reached).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
113. Id. § 160(c).
114. See Camelot Terrace, 357 N.L.R.B. 161 (2011) (“Indeed, in light of the Act’s express grant of power
to the Board to conduct trials, it cannot be gainsaid that the authority to preserve the integrity of
those trials is ‘necessarily implied’ in the grant.”).
115. Unbelievable, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1995).
116. Id. at 859.
117. Camelot Terrace, 357 N.L.R.B. 161.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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conciliation proceedings. The statutory authority granted to the NLRB by
which it reviews bargaining agreements for good faith would work well for
courts evaluating conciliation procedures.
III. ANALYSIS
Judicial review of conciliation is necessary. The Commission has a
duty to conciliate, which is required by Title VII and emphasized in the
legislative history. The Seventh Circuit’s decision rejecting failure to
conciliate as an affirmative defense was incorrect. The minimal review
approach is the proper standard of judicial review to ensure that the
Commission engaged in good faith efforts of conciliation. The approach
used by the NLRB should serve as a model for judicial review of conciliation.
Furthermore, Congress should amend Title VII to provide courts the power
to sanction the Commission or an employer that does not engage in a good
faith conciliation process.
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision Is Inconsistent with the Purpose of
Conciliation
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision does not make sense in light of
the legislative history and the majority of jurisdictions’ determinations that
the statute requires conciliation. The Seventh Circuit stated that judicial
review of conciliation is unnecessary because the Commission has deference
to accept or reject a conciliation agreement;120 however, this argument gives
too much deference to the Commission and does not encourage voluntary
compliance through out-of-court settlements. Without the availability of an
affirmative defense for failure to conciliate, there is no way to ensure the
Commission engages in good faith conciliation. If the Commission can
bypass the conciliation requirement without any retribution from the judicial
branch, the duty to conciliate becomes almost unenforceable.
Judicial review is one of the fundamental aspects of our legal system,121
and it does not make sense to hold that judicial review does not exist in this
instance. Judicial review is necessary to ensure Congress’ goal is realized
that employers voluntarily comply with Title VII through out-of-court
settlements. The legislative history of Title VII is clear about the requirement
of conciliation as stated in a 1972 Conference Committee Report, “The
conferees contemplate that the Commission will continue to make every
effort to conciliate as is required by existing law. Only if conciliation proves
120. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
121. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding legislative and executive actions are
judicially reviewable by the Supreme Court).
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to be impossible do we expect the Commission to bring an action in federal
district court to seek enforcement.”122 Thus, it was Congress’ intent that the
Commission engage in good faith conciliation and ensure compliance with
Title VII by reaching out-of-court settlements with an employer. Some
courts have criticized the Commission for using a “shoot first, aim later”
technique.123 Judicial review of conciliation efforts will prevent the
Commission from engaging in unauthentic conciliation procedures and filing
hasty claims against employers without providing the opportunity for
voluntary compliance.124 Judicial review provides a check on the
Commission’s behavior and ensures that there is dedication to obtaining out
of court settlements.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that judicial review of
conciliation should not exist because it conflicts with the confidentiality
provision is unsound. The confidentiality provision states “Nothing said or
done during and as part of [the conciliation process] may be made public by
the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a
subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons
concerned.”125 The Seventh Circuit argued that judicial review of
conciliation forces courts to determine the sufficiency of conciliation efforts
without having evidence to review.126
The “subsequent proceeding” language is similar to Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which prohibits using compromise offers and
negotiations to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed
claim,” but allows the evidence to prove “a witness’s bias or prejudice,
negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.”127 Similarly, the confidentiality
provision seems to mean that anything said in a conciliation procedure cannot
be used to prove or disprove a party’s fault, not that it prohibits a court from
reviewing whether conciliation procedures conformed with the requirements.
Like Rule 408, the confidentiality provision should only prohibit revealing
the content of negotiations when the dispute is taken to trial to determine
122. 118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972).
123. See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013) (awarding attorneys fees to the
employer when the Commission pursued a claim that was unreasonable as it was based on a
nonexistent companywide policy and the Commission continued to pursue the claim after knowing
the alleged policy did not exist).
124. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dunn, No Longer a Paper Tiger: The EEOC and Its Statutory Duty to
Conciliate, 63 EMORY L.J. 455, 458 (2013) (“[A]s the agency increases the number of systemic
discrimination cases it chooses to litigate, the potential for the agency to abuse its statutory duty to
conciliate increases.”).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2013).
126. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
127. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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whether the employer actually engaged in the alleged employment
discrimination. Furthermore, confidential information is regularly reviewed
by courts without a problem, and court records can be sealed and kept
confidential.128 Thus, judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation
efforts should not fail simply because the information to be reviewed is
confidential to the public.
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning for rejecting the approaches taken by
other circuits is insufficient. The court argued that minimal review of the
Commission’s conciliation efforts was unnecessary because good faith
conciliation is not required by the statute.129 However, it is common to imply
a good faith requirement in both contracts and negotiations.130 Furthermore,
in the labor law context, the NLRA requires an employer and union to act in
good faith when engaging in collective bargaining.131 It does not make sense
for Title VII to require conciliation as a prerequisite to filing suit, but not
require parties to act in good faith. If parties were not required to act in good
faith, Congress’ goal of achieving voluntary compliance through out of court
statements would never be met.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that there is no express
provision regarding judicial review of conciliation efforts in Title VII is not
persuasive because there is no provision rejecting judicial review of
conciliation.132 The majority of circuits’ policy of allowing judicial review
to determine whether the Commission engaged in its duty to conciliate
should not be eliminated simply because it is not expressly stated in the
statute.
It seems the main reason why the Seventh Circuit no longer allows
judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is because, the court
argued, it provides a way for employers to get off the hook though a
procedural technicality.133 However, the statute allows for judges to stay
proceedings for further conciliation efforts.134 This provision provides a
method by which a court can order the parties to reopen conciliation
procedures. This provision implies that some level of judicial involvement
is expected in the conciliation process because without insight into the
128. See, e.g., ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET
GUIDE 1 (2010) (“Courts will keep confidential classified information, ongoing investigations, trade
secrets, and the identities of minors, for example.”).
129. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183.
130. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001) (“Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”).
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2013).
133. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings
for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in
subsections (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary
compliance.”).
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conciliation proceedings, a court would not know when to grant a stay in
proceedings.
B. A Minimal Review for a Good Faith Attempt at Conciliation Is the Best
Method of Judicial Review
A minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is the proper
standard because it balances the equities of each approach by both
encouraging the Commission to resolve conflicts with employers out-ofcourt and by preventing an employer from getting off the hook due to a
procedural technicality.
First, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is the
proper standard because it encourages the Commission to resolve claims
against employers through out-of-court settlements. The circuits employing
a more exacting review seem concerned that the Commission may engage in
bad faith conciliation efforts and simply avoid participating in out-of-court
settlements.135 However, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation
efforts encourages out-of-court settlements by allowing the Commission to
use its expertise in determining whether an agreement is acceptable. The
Commission does not have to be concerned that judges will impose their own
beliefs regarding the content of a conciliation agreement. However, the
requirement of good faith provides guidance to the Commission and
employers of the appropriate level of effort needed when attempting
voluntary compliance with Title VII through conciliation.
The three-part method is not the proper standard of judicial review
because it restricts the power granted to the Commission in Title VII.
Specifically, the statute states, “[If] the Commission has been unable to
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any
respondent . . . .”136 The use of the terms “acceptable to the Commission”
suggests that Congress intended to grant the Commission with the power to
determine whether it has truly reached an impasse with an employer, which
may only be resolved through litigation. As stated by the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he
form and substance of those conciliations is within the discretion of the
EEOC as the agency created to administer and enforce our employment
discrimination laws and is beyond judicial review.”137 Therefore, minimal
review is appropriate because the Commission has the power to determine
135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the Commission failed its duty to conciliate by using an “all or nothing approach” and “nothing less
than a ‘reasonable’ effort to resolve with the employer the issues raised by the complainant” is
required to engage in good faith conciliation).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
137. EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984).
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the form and substance of a conciliation agreement, but judicial review is
allowed to ensure that good faith was used in the Commission’s conciliation
attempts.
This grant of power to accept or reject an agreement should be
supported by the Supreme Court, which has taken a plain meaning approach
when evaluating the meaning of statutes.138 This approach requires that
“unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.”139 The plain language of Title VII shows
deference to the Commission through the use of the phrase “acceptable to the
Commission.”140 A minimal level of judicial review aligns perfectly with the
deference granted to the Commission because it leaves the form and
substance of conciliation to the discretion of the Commission and looks only
at whether there was a good faith attempt to conciliate matters.141 Although
this minimal review provides a check on the Commission’s conciliation
efforts, a court may not insert its own views regarding the terms of the
conciliation agreement and must only determine whether the Commission
engaged in a good faith effort to conciliate.142 This level of deference is not
found in the three-step approach, which takes a less trusting and harsher view
towards the Commission’s efforts by examining the content and process of
conciliation.143 Congress clearly did not intend for the judiciary to distrust
the Commission when it expressly granted authority.
Further, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts will
prevent an employer from getting off the hook due to a procedural
technicality. Because a minimal review does not allow courts to find the
Commission engaged in bad faith conciliation when a judge personally
disagrees with a conciliation offer, employers will no longer be able to use
this defense when it believes the Commission offered them a demanding
deal. An employer will be encouraged to attempt voluntary compliance with
the Commission rather than waste time and resources challenging the content
of a conciliation offer. In this way, both the employer and the Commission
will be encouraged to act in good faith.

138. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (using the plain meaning approach to
define the term “clothes” in a statute). See generally Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age
of Textualism: A Practitioner’s Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L.
REV. 451, 453 (2002) (“Arguments rooted in non-textual considerations, if not totally eviscerated,
are not held in favor by the courts.”).
139. Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 877 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
141. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102.
142. See id. at 1102.
143. See, e.g., EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003) (deciding whether
the Commission engaged in good faith conciliation, the court looked at the content of the proposed
conciliation agreement).
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The Seventh Circuit argued that the remedies available for failure to
conciliate do not encourage employers’ voluntary compliance.144 To address
these concerns, the statute should be amended to provide courts with the
power to impose sanctions against both the Commission or an employer
when either fails to participate in a good faith effort of conciliation.
Amending the statute will provide the courts with the requisite power to
enforce the conciliation requirement, ensuring that both the Commission and
employers engage in good faith efforts to resolve disputes out of court.
C. Proposal: Congress Should Allow Courts to Sanction a Party that Does
Not Participate in Good Faith in Conciliation
Judicial review of conciliation efforts is necessary to encourage
voluntary compliance through out-of-court negotiations and settlements. It
is imperative that both the employer and the Commission engage in good
faith efforts to conciliate to provide the voluntary compliance that Congress
intended. The use of a “failure to conciliate” affirmative defense should not
provide the opportunity for employers to get off the hook for potential
discriminatory actions. Rather, the defense should provide a remedy that
encourages compliance with conciliation procedures for both the
Commission and the employer. The NLRA’s approach to collective
bargaining, through which the NLRB may review collective bargaining
procedures to determine whether good faith was used, should provide a
model for Congress to establish an appropriate remedy.145
The NLRB’s ability to review collective bargaining procedures is
similar to judicial review of conciliation because it examines whether good
faith was used.146 It is crucial that the NLRB is statutorily authorized to
impose sanctions on both employers and unions who do not engage in good
faith collective bargaining procedures, as it does not allow for either party to
get off the hook when the other does not engage in good faith conciliation.
The statutory authorization provides guidance to the NLRB regarding what
sanctions are allowed as well as encouragement to unions and employers to
engage in good faith collective bargaining. Knowing that the actions are
reviewable and having notice of possible sanctions makes collective
bargaining procedures meaningful because the parties will want to
voluntarily comply without the NLRB’s involvement, instead of wasting
144. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 183 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013). See also Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last visited Apr. 13,
2015) (explaining how the NLRB reviews good faith by determining whether a true impasse has
been reached based on “the history of negotiations and understandings of both parties”).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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time, money, and resources. Furthermore, the parties cannot avoid their
problem by arguing that the other party did not engage in the statutory good
faith requirement because the court will just require them to return to the
bargaining table.
Congress should amend the statute to provide a remedy similar to that
given to the NLRB. Without a prescribed remedy, judicial review of
conciliation seems almost meaningless. It is clear that Congress did not
intend for employers to get off the hook for discriminatory practices. Instead,
by requiring the Commission to attempt conciliation prior to bringing a claim
against an employer, Congress meant for employers to voluntarily comply
with Title VII by eradicating any discriminatory practices. Reaching this
goal requires the participation of both the employer and the Commission,
which is why an approach similar to the NLRB’s is necessary. If the court
can review and sanction both the employer and the Commission, each party
will be compelled to engage in good faith in the conciliation process from
the beginning. Judicial review is necessary, but without an enforcement
mechanism it becomes a way to prolong litigation without reaching voluntary
compliance. Therefore, Congress should amend § 2000e-5 of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to provide a remedy when the
Commission engages in conciliation with an employer, and either party is
found to have failed their duty to engage in good faith conciliation.
The remedy should be placed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) because, among
other things, this section contains the preconditions and the procedure for the
Commission to file suit. Using the NLRA’s language for guidance,147 the
statute could provide:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, a court shall be of the
opinion that any party named in the complaint has failed to engage in a good
faith attempt at conciliation, then the Court shall state its findings of fact
and shall issue an order for the conciliation process to be resumed and any
other action as will effectuate the policies of this Act.

It also makes sense for Congress to add a possible remedy similar to the
NLRB’s additional sanction of reimbursing the charging party for
negotiating expenses.148 The statute could provide “Where a party
147. See id. § 160(c) (“If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to
take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as well
as effectuate the policies of this Act . . . .”).
148. See Unbelievable, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1995) (“[Where] a respondent's substantial unfair
labor practices have infected the core of a bargaining process to such an extent that their effects
cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an order requiring the respondent
to reimburse the charging party for negotiation expenses is warranted . . . .”).
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participates in bad faith in the conciliation process to such an extent that the
effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an
order requiring the respondent to reimburse the charging party for
conciliation expenses, including attorney’s fees, is warranted.”
This is an appropriate action because it clearly states the repercussions
of not participating in good faith in conciliation procedures. It would work
well because both the Commission and an employer could pursue this remedy
if either feels the other party is not sincerely participating in the process. If
the Commission acts in haste and does not participate in good faith in the
conciliation process, the employer is not off the hook. Rather, the
conciliation process will be reopened and revisited. Furthermore, the
additional sanction of having to pay the other party’s conciliation expenses
and attorney’s fees for wasting time and resources emphasizes the
importance of conciliation. These remedies encourage all parties to
participate fully in conciliation procedures to reach voluntary compliance
because, if a court finds the party did not participate in good faith, the
procedures will be reopened.
Although voluntary compliance with Title VII is the goal, it will not
always be possible. The Commission may file suit when an employer
maintains it has not engaged in the alleged discriminatory practice. At this
point, a court’s judgment will be necessary to determine the rights and
responsibilities of the parties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the Commission and employers have engaged in bad faith
conciliation procedures in the past. However, employers have used the
Commission’s mistakes to their advantage to avoid litigation. It is imperative
that the failure to conciliate continues as an affirmative defense to encourage
parties to engage in good faith conciliation procedures and ensure Congress’
goal of encouraging out of court negotiations and settlements is met. This
defense should be available to both parties when either believes the other
party has not engaged in good faith endeavors at conciliation. A minimal
review of conciliation efforts is the proper standard because it provides the
Commission with deference to determine the appropriate conciliation
agreement in the circumstances, but also provides an incentive for the parties
to conciliate properly the first time.
Furthermore, Congress should amend 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) to provide
that a party who has engaged in bad faith conciliation may have to pay the
other party’s attorney’s fees or negotiation costs. Although Congress granted
the Commission with the power to bring suit against an employer it believes
has engaged in unlawful discrimination, the Commission must follow the
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conciliation procedures in place. A minimal review of conciliation
procedures and a statutory amendment are the best way to ensure the
statutory requirements are meaningfully followed.

